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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter trace how “transnational migration law” has come to construct human mo­
bility. It argues that transnational migration law is best conceived of as a useful method­
ological approach, rather than a distinct area of legal doctrine or spatial domain of law. 
Conceived as a method, transnational migration law can reveal the juridical assemblage 
of practices, subjects, and relations for regulating migration. This chapter illuminates 
some of the core and potentially rival sites, forms, and practices of transnational migra­
tion lawmaking, drawing attention to the productive and coercive forces of transnational 
migration law that have resulted in the maintenance of a “global hierarchy of mobility.” 
Yet, recognizing that state attempts to monopolize “the legitimate means of movement” 
are incomplete and contested, the chapter argues that scholars of “transnational migra­
tion law” must pay attention to diverse and situated Indigenous legal traditions as 
sources of authority. In doing so, the chapter critically unpacks the relationship between 
migration and struggles for decolonization and global justice.
Keywords: migration, human mobility, plural authority, state violence, global justice, Indigenous sovereignty
I. Introduction
ON July 20, 2015, the Haudenosaunee Nation Women’s Lacrosse Under-19 team, the Hau­
denosaunee Nationals, announced that they would no longer be competing in the World 
Championships scheduled to begin a few days later in Edinburgh, Scotland. The reason 
for their withdrawal was the persistent refusal of UK immigration officials to recognize 
the team members’ Haudenosaunee passports for the purpose of entering the United 
Kingdom.1 This refusal had previously sparked a diplomatic standoff in 2000, when the 
Iroquois Nationals men’s squad was unable to travel to compete in a world tournament 
held in Manchester, England, for a similar reason. Yet, after much political efforts on the 
part of Haudenosaunee diplomats, two years later, the Haudenosaunee Nationals would 
play in the 2017 World Championship held in Guildford, England, having arrived in the 
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United Kingdom on their Haudenosaunee passports.2 In the words of the Haudenosaunee 
women’s (p. 684) team captain Amber Hill, this was an important moment that represent­
ed an “acknowledgment of the Haudenosaunee as our own sovereign people.”3
This chapter suggests that the struggle over the recognition of the Haudenosaunee pass­
port can be read as a story about transnational migration law. Rather than simply a mat­
ter of conflicting jurisdictions, overlapping sovereignties or the lawfulness of a particular 
document, it also denotes a fundamental struggle over the very recognition and definition 
of a lawful authority and the power to authorize lawful movement at the start of the twen­
ty-first century. In the context of migration, such legal struggles occur between a plethora 
of potentially “rival” authorities seeking to bring the regulation of mobile people into 
their jurisdiction.4 In this chapter, I seek to capture such struggles through describing 
and theorizing “transnational migration law.” Here, I understand “transnational migration 
law” to be a juridical assemblage of practices, subjects, and relations that become visible 
through a particular analytics that refracts questions of legal authority and lawful rela­
tions through the concept of the “transnational.” In short, this means transnational mi­
gration law is not a specific preexisting field of law, or readily-accessible object of study, 
but rather must necessarily be constructed into a recognized area of legal inquiry, en­
gagement, and analysis.
My argument is that transnational migration law is best conceived of as the product of a 
mode of scholarly engagement and critique concerning the regulation of human mobility 
that is facilitated through an attentiveness to the idiom of the “transnational.” Following 
Zumbansen, the idiom of the “transnational” is less a spatial domain than a useful 
methodological approach that, in the context of international migration, can reveal how 
human mobility has come to be governed, ordered, and contested in the contemporary 
world.5 The idiom of the “transnational” thus offers a lens for analyzing and denaturaliz­
ing the international system of nation-states in the present, and helps us to understand 
how modern states—as powerful political institutions that purport to monopolize the “le­
gitimate means of movement”6—have been made, enacted, and challenged by a range of 
actors, processes, and collectives, within and beyond the nation.
This chapter consists of two sections. In section II, I unpack the idiom of the “transnation­
al” in relation to migration (and) law, and then proceed to map a range of practices enact­
ed by different, at times rival, authorities in the contemporary world. While it would be 
impossible to adequately touch upon the diversity of public and private actors that give 
(p. 685) shape to the transnational regulation of migration, what I hope to illuminate are 
some core contested sites, forms, and practices of legality that these actors have come to 
create and use in the regulation of human mobility. Here in particular, I draw attention to 
the technologies of control, differentiation, and selection that have come to characterize 
much of transnational migration law. Taken together, these practices and technologies 
constitute the productive and coercive forces of transnational migration law. In section 
III, I argue that scholars of transnational migration law need to think critically about the 
relationship between migration and struggles for decolonization and global justice. In set­
tler-colonial contexts, this means holding on to an antiracist politics that challenges state 
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law’s logics and practices of stratification, selection, elimination, and exclusion, while al­
so centering diverse and situated Indigenous legal traditions as sources of authority in 
the making of migration laws.7 Furthermore, attending to the relationship between the 
multitude of struggles for migrant justice around the world and situated projects of decol­
onization is all the more pressing in light of the increasing technologies of control, con­
tainment, surveillance, and segregation that states are employing in their regulation of 
human mobility at the start of the twenty-first century. Such technologies have resulted in 
the maintenance of a “global hierarchy of mobility”—or what some scholars have called 
“global apartheid”—that allows the global elite to travel with security, resources, and 
ease while other racialized migrants, primarily poorer people of color from the Global 
South, may only be able to travel in limited, bonded, precarious, unauthorized, or danger­
ous ways.8
II. Conceptualizing Transnational Migration 
Law
A. Key Concepts
The term “transnational migration law” requires some probing. It is, after all, a term that 
can be located in different scholarly traditions of thinking about human relations outside 
of and beyond the state, most notably in legal scholarship that position an analytics of 
“transnational law” against mid-twentieth-century formalist accounts of international 
law.9 The (p. 686) concept of “migration” also, as distinct from terms such as “travel,” “col­
onization,” “movement,” or “resettlement,” has particular connotations. For this reason, 
each element of the term “transnational migration law” needs unpacking. What does it 
mean to speak of something as “transnational” (whether it be a phenomenon, a subject of 
legal regulation, a legal domain, or an approach to law)? How might we understand “mi­
gration” as an object of study? And what is at stake in our accounts of law as transnation­
al in conceptualizing the regulation of “migration”? To respond to these broad questions, 
I consider each element of the term “transnational migration law” in turn.
First, transnational: I argue that the idiom of the transnational offers a critical viewpoint 
for, first, showing the limits of how conventional accounts of migration law in both their 
domestic and international guises are understood and for, second, offering a reconstruct­
ed understanding of how human mobility is governed in our contemporary world. This lat­
ter reconstructive gesture allows for capturing legal relations that extend beyond and 
constitute the territorial space of the “national” such that they might be thought of as 
creating a particular legal domain—that of transnational migration law—differently. Put 
otherwise, this chapter uses the analytics of “transnational” not as a spatial term that 
seeks to overcome or unsettle the tired binary between the domestic and international. 
This means that the transnational is not a subcategory of scale structured through a log­
ics of verticality where the “transnational” ambivalently sits somewhere between the 
“global” and the “local.” Rather, the idiom of the “transnational” offers what might be 
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best thought of as a diagnostic from which to mount a critique of existing ways of framing 
“migration law” as well as for refiguring legal relations. In this latter sense, it offers an 
analytics of relations: that is, a transnational approach allows us to make visible the pro­
duction, enactment, and maintenance of particular sets of structural relations and the en­
actment of an assemblage of legal practices that shape how people move in the contem­
porary world.10 In the context of migration, this can mean looking to the regulatory pow­
er and effects of transnational structures of capitalism and neoliberal globalization along­
side the complex set of migrant networks that span across different cities in different 
states for an account of the legal regulation of human mobility. Yet, in referencing the 
“national,” the term transnational also risks recentering the state in the discussion, natu­
ralizing the state as a stable historical actor and political concept despite the fact that the 
emergence and maintenance of the state as a principal political authority has been a re­
cent historical phenomenon and one that must be constantly enacted, reimagined, and 
held together through a variety of institutional techniques and practices.
Next, migration: I understand human mobility to be the capacity of people to move across 
space and their physical acts of movement, including moving in-between and across 
spaces marked by different and potentially rival political authorities. In contrast, I take 
migration to refer to specific forms of human mobility that are shaped through law and 
regulation. To speak of migration is then to always already reference the product of par­
ticular legal and institutional arrangements that determine or channel how people can 
and do move, and how that movement is understood, enabled and authorized (or not, as 
in the case of illegalised or clandestine migration). In the contemporary world, this means 
recognizing that references to the term “migration”—either as “internal” or “internation­
al”—rely upon the existence of the state as the dominant and purportedly universalized 
container that structures (p. 687) ideas of human life, sociality, and belonging, and has be­
come an assumed referent in our understandings of human mobility. Holding on to the 
distinction then between human mobility and migration importantly allows for question­
ing how different forms of human mobility come to be framed, conditioned, and chan­
neled through historically specific political institutions (such as the state) and the associ­
ated regimes of migration law and regulation that these institutions have enabled and 
protected. This includes noticing the assemblage of terminologies, techniques, and norms 
for controlling or channeling human mobility that have made mobility across state bor­
ders “not equally accessible for all.”11 Distinguishing between “migration” and “human 
mobility” also allows for thinking critically about the regulation of human mobility 
through the categories offered by either international or domestic law such as “economic 
migrant,” “illegal immigrant,” “refugees,” “trade in services,” “family reunification,” or 
“citizen.” Or to put it more fundamentally, it allows for a recognition that the very catego­
rization of a person as a “migrant” or “citizen” also already rests upon a prior recognition 
of a set of legal institutions, techniques, and categories that structure our understanding 
of the particular relation between a person and the space that they inhabit or move in. By 
extension, to refer to “migration law” then frequently takes for granted the way that hu­
man mobility may be shaped through institutional regimes, most notably through assum­
ing the presence of the state as the main container for authorizing and regulating human 
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mobility. Or, as Catherine Dauvergne has put it, “without immigration law there is no such 
thing as illegal migration.”12
And finally, law: here, rather than setting out a precise definition of law, I adopt an orien­
tation toward thinking about law through questions of its authorization, mechanics, and 
contestations—as well as the prior question of recognition. What forms of political author­
ity are recognized as lawful? Through what modes of representation are forms of law au­
thorized or enacted? How do different forms of law encounter or relate to each other? 
This means that instead of enumerating the doctrines and sources of transnational migra­
tion law, I am instead interested in attending to struggles over the authority to regulate 
human mobility that involve, exceed and displace the modern state as the only perceived 
source or form of “proper” law in the world.13 This might be best thought of as a project 
of critically redescribing the world through an attentiveness to plural legal authorities 
and practices of law that order relations between mobile people and political authorities 
in specific times and places.14 It also (p. 688) involves a recognition of state law as the ac­
tive agent in processes of illegalization, that is, in “making people illegal.”15
How then has human mobility come to be regulated at the turn of the twenty-first centu­
ry? In this new millennium, it has become commonplace to say that we live in a world of 
human mobility. The 2017 UN Secretary-General Report, entitled Making Migration Work 
for All, for instance, began by noting that migration is an “an expanding global reality,” a 
phenomenon that represents “one of the most urgent and profound tests of international 
cooperation in our time.”16 This language of urgency and crisis is habitually reiterated, in­
cluding in official state discourses, institutional documents, and media representations. 
We need only think of a few recent examples to suffice: the “global refugee crisis,” the 
“2014 Central American—US migration crisis,” the “European migration crisis of 2015,” 
and so forth. Similarly, migration law itself—in both its domestic and international guises 
—is also commonly depicted through the language of crisis.17 State immigration laws, in 
such depictions, are said to be threatened by the mass displacement or influx of people 
into a particular state, or failing the community of citizens who implemented them (by, for 
example, offering “too many” rights and benefits to noncitizens) such that it is deemed to 
be in need of reform or renewal. This language of “crisis” reflects what sociologist Zyg­
munt Bauman has termed “migration panic,” referring to rhetorical discourses that are 
directed toward infusing a sense of fear and vulnerability in migrant-receiving societies.18 
Rather than illuminating the forces of global capitalism and economic liberalization that 
may compel migrants from states experiencing the ongoing legacies of colonization, polit­
ical conflicts and economic turmoil to move, discourses of moral panic instead target mi­
grants to make them into “collateral victims” of migrant receiving states’ anxieties and in­
securities.
Additionally, the dual framings of these “crises” of human mobility and of law assume a 
particular state of normalcy where people can and should move in a certain, consistent 
ways and state law can and should control migration, thus maintaining an illusion and 
project of control over mobile people for the state. It also obscures the fact that the over­
whelming number of people in the world remains sedentary, either by choice or by cir­
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cumstance. While the number of people globally classified as “migrants” has grown in re­
cent years, migrants still only constitute around 3.4 percent of the world’s population, 
even if this percentage—as is stated in the UN Secretary-General’s report—amounts to an 
estimated 258 million people. In adopting a critical distance to this language of “crisis,” 
this chapter instead seeks to uncover how control over human mobility is itself a struggle 
between different and at times rival political authorities. To do so, in the next subsection, 
I turn to the more mundane and everyday modes of regulating human mobility that, de­
spite—or perhaps even more accurately, owing to—their “normalcy” or technicality, can 
still have severe (p. 689) effects and consequences for people who migrate in ways that 
may be unauthorized by states or that led to the production of deportability, regimes of 
racial exclusion or lives of precarious and exploitable existence.
B. Mapping the Plural and Contested Actors, Sites, and Modes of 
Transnational Migration Lawmaking
In this section, I posit that giving an account of transnational migration law means mak­
ing visible plural and contested sites and modes of regulation, actors of lawmaking, and 
forms of authority and legal subjects and relations of control over mobile people. This 
project of recognition and mapping can then facilitate foregrounding the effects of 
transnational migration law in positioning certain people as racialized, precarious, and 
deportable “migrants” who are not entitled to the same legal protections and forms of so­
cial belonging as those people recognized as “citizens.”19 Analytically, such exercises in 
describing transnational migration law as a constituted field of legal inquiry, engagement, 
and analysis allows us to see what I shall refer to as both the productive and coercive 
forces at work in this domain. That is, how particular sites, subjects, and forms of legal 
authority are produced, assembled and regulated (productive forces), and the effects of 
that regulation in creating new hierarchies, forms of power/exploitation, and political con­
testations and possibilities (coercive forces). This acknowledgment of the productive and 
coercive forces of transnational migration law needs to be tempered with a recognition 
that the state’s purported monopoly over the “legitimate means of movement” has never 
been, and can never be, fully realized in the face of migrants who travel clandestinely in 
defiance of state borders and, in the context of settler colonial states, Indigenous nations 
who maintain their sovereignty over land and people.
As a starting point, a politically informed and empirically accurate account of transnation­
al migration law should recognize “migrants” as law-creating actors who are involved in 
shaping, negotiating, and resisting spaces of regulation within and beyond the state. For 
instance, this can entail noticing how regimes of migration control are necessarily re­
sponsive to the very movement and action of mobile people and how the decision-making 
of migrants and the routes that they choose to migrate along “can force the reorganisa­
tion of control itself.”20 For instance, in recent years, migrant use of technologies such as 
mobile phones along popular routes of mass migration has allowed migrants to increase 
their access to information, to initiate rescue operations, and to articulate new sets of 
rights claims in law (such as the right to a mobile phone), while also informing and trans­
forming (p. 690) how state and other authorities use digital tracking and surveillance to 
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monitor and control unauthorized movement.21 Additionally, centering the lawmaking ac­
tion of migrants can mean acknowledging migrants as part of local or transnational civil 
society coalitions that create “alternative political spaces to the ‘official’ fora” of transna­
tional migration governance while nonetheless still recognizing them as, what Stefan 
Rother has called, “transnationally marginalized groups.”22 The “Civil Society Days” as 
part of the Global Forum on Migration and Development provide one such example of a 
space and platform from which migrants can articulate regulatory proposals and de­
mands.23 Another good example of such latter forms of regulation is the Coalition of 
Immokalee Workers (CIW)’s Fair Food Program that has improved the conditions of mi­
grant farmer workers in the tomato industry in Florida and other eastern coast states in 
the United States. The program adopts a variety of mechanisms for regulating the indus­
try supply chain including legally binding agreements with large-scale buyers and con­
sumer education campaigns. These mechanisms are largely worker-driven and worker- 
certified, and center around a Code of Conduct that covers key areas of workers’ rights 
and protections (including wages, occupational health and safety, antidiscrimination, 
etc.).24 While the program does not address the regulation of migrant admissions or sta­
tus in the United States (what might be considered the “traditional” doctrinal area of im­
migration law), it does affect what gets recognized as the “proper” working conditions of 
certain migrant farmer workers and their enforceability in practice. It is thus one in­
stance of migrant worker lawmaking, standard-setting, and enforcement that forms part 
of the assemblage of norms, practices, actors and processes that make up transnational 
migration law.
Undoubtedly, states have become central actors in channeling and controlling migration. 
State institutions can and routinely do enact immigration laws, administer visa regimes, 
police the immigration status of individuals in their territories, and deport people deemed 
to be noncitizens without entitlement to remain within the espoused territory of the par­
ticular state. In this way, states have attempted to assert a principal monopoly over how 
state-based regime of nationality and/or citizenship operate, dictating not only the formal 
rights, privileges, and access to resources of individuals within a state’s territory but also 
affecting how this bestowal of status is recognized by other states too. After all, a 
person’s recognized nationality is a significant determinant of their ability to access state 
documentation that can facilitate authorized and safe travel to other states, with different 
state passports treated vastly differently by state authorities. While this emergent global 
hierarchy of passports (p. 691) allows some “privileged” travelers—primarily individuals 
from economically powerful states, often in the Global North—to migrate with little con­
sideration of state and regional visa regimes, for others it can result in stasis due to dis­
criminatory visa regulations and restrictions elsewhere.25
Yet, an attentiveness to different forms of legal authority entails disaggregating the state 
as an actor to understand how bodies within a state may act in at times contradictory 
ways in the regulation of migration, or indeed, how different states approach regulating 
human mobility.26 For example, while state immigration authorities may act to select, fil­
ter, and/or exclude potential and actual migrants from a state’s territory, state employ­
ment law enforcement bodies may act to recognize migrants as legal subjects with partic­
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ular entitlements irrespective of their migration status, including people who may no 
longer be physically present in the territory of a state. In South Africa, for instance, the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) has since 2008 recog­
nized that migrants working in South Africa “illegally”—that is without state authoriza­
tion or documentation—are entitled under the South African Constitution to the protec­
tions of South African labor laws and standards, including against unfair dismissal. This 
recognition has had the effect of bringing the regulation of unauthorized migrant workers 
outside of a purely immigration enforcement jurisdiction and into a much broader 
purview of state institutions.27 While this formal development is significant, in practice, 
many migrant workers still appear to be reluctant to access such protections for fear of 
deportation by the state or retribution from their employers.28
Such instances of state lawmaking and rearrangements of jurisdiction might extend cer­
tain aspects of labor law protection; yet they nonetheless remain limited in addressing 
the underlying economic and social dynamics that compel migrant workers to accept jobs 
with limited rights and remunerations, or indeed, state impositions of the fundamental 
distinction between citizens/noncitizens. In Canada, for example, the Ontario Workplace 
Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decided in 2017 that a migrant worker from Ja­
maica, Michael Campbell, was entitled to partial-loss-of-earning benefits after he sus­
tained a back injury while working on a fruit farm as part of Canada’s Seasonal Agricul­
tural Workers Program (SAWP).29 A key consideration in the case was whether the quan­
tum of the man’s entitlement should be assessed with reference to a suitable occupation 
available to him in Canada or in his home state of Jamaica. In deciding the latter, the rul­
ing overturned an earlier Workplace Safety and Insurance Board decision to cut 
Campbell’s entitlements on the basis that he could find alternative work as a cashier in 
Ontario, despite the fact that Campbell had long since returned to live in rural Jamaica 
and had no entitlement to return (p. 692) to Canada. While the ruling provides an impor­
tant benchmark for subsequent compensation claims by injured migrant workers who are 
working or have worked in Canada, it ultimately remains unable to challenge how the 
SAWP’s specific mode of production and profitability rests of the creation and supply of 
an unfree, deportable, racialized, and precarious labor force that may place them at 
greater risk of particular work place injuries.30
Alongside this attentiveness to such varied forms of state regulation, transnational migra­
tion law also encompasses the growing raft of international norms, conventions, process­
es, and others instruments that have come to challenge, complicate, or interact with state 
attempts to monopolize the “legitimate means of movement.”31 Here key instruments di­
rectly addressing migrant rights or criminalizing certain forms of violence against mi­
grants include the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Fami­
lies (1990), the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), 
and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2000). Yet, a 
multitude of other instruments and processes covering discrete aspects of human mobili­
ty in the fields of trade, labor, human rights, maritime and air law, consular and diplomat­
ic protection, and nationality law also add to this expanding yet fragmented international 
jurisdiction. While these instruments might “converge” with or “diverge” from each other 
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in terms of their norms, processes, and substance, depending on specific regime interac­
tions, in general, they cohere around a dominant understanding of sovereignty that al­
lows states to exclude non-nationals as a state sees fit and places no duty of admission on 
states (with only minor exceptions most notably for humanitarian reasons in the context 
of refugee law or for the protection of life under the law of the sea).32 Nonetheless, as­
serting and determining the jurisdiction of a particular international instrument can af­
fect the obligations and conduct of states toward migrants once they have been lawfully 
admitted into their territories.
Regional interstate bodies too have become contested sites for the adjudication and regu­
lation of migrant standards that can challenge a state’s distribution and restriction of en­
try, rights and resources. These regional authorities have given particular substance to 
how key norms within international instruments should be interpreted and applied, and 
have provided key sites for scrutinizing state conduct and, at times, advancing migrant 
rights. The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, for instance, has held that 
state authorities should not deport an individual without “giving them the possibility to 
plead their case before the competent national courts,” irrespective of their immigration 
status.33 To take another similar example from a different regional context: in 2003, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR) issued an important advisory opinion 
on the rights of undocumented migrants, at the request of Mexico who was motivated by 
the treatment of Mexican nationals in the United States. The Court’s Advisory Opinion 
emphasized that all states are required to respect and protect the principles of nondis­
crimination and equality of individuals before the law as a jus cogens norm of internation­
al law, including in (p. 693) relation to the treatment of migrants and noncitizens. Critical­
ly, the Court stated the “migratory status of a person can never be a justification for de­
priving him [sic] of the enjoyment and exercise of his [sic] human rights, including those 
related to employment.”34
More recently, in 2016, an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAComHR) de­
cision found that the United States had violated the rights of undocumented workers by 
failing to provide them with Social Security benefits and equal treatment before the 
law.35 The case concerned two Mexican nationals, Leopoldo Zumaya and Francisco Beru­
men Lizalde, who had both been injured while working in the United States, the former 
man as an apple picker and the latter man as a painter. Both the IAComHR decision and 
the Mexican request of the IACrtHR Advisory Opinion were in response to an earlier 2002 
US Supreme Court decision of Hoffman Plastic Compounds that had held that an undocu­
mented worker who had been illegally fired by her employer was not entitled to recover 
unpaid wages nor any lost earnings.36 Through its decision that included several recom­
mendations for US domestic law reform, the IAComHR positioned itself as the proper au­
thority for determining the rightful distribution of rights and resources within its member 
states including to people present within a political community without state authoriza­
tion. In response, the US expressed “disappointment” in the Commission’s rejection of 
the United States’ argument that the case was inadmissible on the basis of time restric­
tions, and noted that it “strongly disagreed” with the Commission’s finding that the Unit­
ed States had “any international legal obligations” in regards to the matter.37 Scholars 
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have noted that the Inter-American human rights institutions—as new sites of struggle 
over migrant rights—have demonstrated a “remarkable” willingness to place “human be­
ings at the centre” of their jurisprudence,38 even if their actions have not necessarily 
“brought about clear improvements in the treatment of migrant workers in the region.”39
Yet the effect of such political, economic, and judicial institutional regionalization of the 
regulation of human mobility is paradoxical: oscillating between enabling new forms of 
contestation, on the one hand, and new modes of norm harmonization in line with state 
conduct, on the other. This means that while some actions of regional institutions do chal­
lenge states’ ability to exclusively determine the rights and conditions of migrants in their 
territories, other regional initiatives act to bolster and rationalize the authority of a state 
to manifest more exclusive control over human mobility at and within its borders. For ex­
ample, since 2006, the African Union has had a Migration Policy Framework for Africa 
that reiterates principles of state sovereignty while providing member states with “com­
prehensive policy guidelines and principles” in a range of areas (labor migration, border 
governance, irregular migration, forced displacement, etc.) to assist in the development 
of each state’s migration, custom, labor, (p. 694) trade, and other laws.40 The AU also has 
an African Union Labour Migration Advisory Committee, whose mandate is to facilitate, 
monitor, and report on the implementation of AU migrant worker standards in the region. 
While these instruments might best be considered “soft law,” they can still be instructive 
in shaping the behavior of states in their treatment of migrants. Understanding transna­
tional migration law then requires an attentiveness not only to the developments, techni­
calities, and impacts of these regional regimes but also to the “interplay” between differ­
ent forms of regionalism vis-à-vis international institutions, domestic law, civil society ac­
tors, and migrants themselves.41
Alongside such dynamics of regionalization, a multitude of other private and quasi-private 
actors have come to be enrolled in the facilitation and regulation of international migra­
tion, creating new relationships of both antagonism and exploitation on the one hand, and 
dependency and profit on the other. On the recruitment side of labor migration, the role 
of labor brokers in states of origin has transformed from being mere facilitators of migra­
tion to acting as key drivers of the migration process as so-called “merchants of labour.”42 
It is estimated that there are now thousands of small licensed migrant worker recruit­
ment agencies located in capital cities across Asia in addition to unlicensed recruiters.43 
The actions of these labor brokers can not only profoundly shape the experiences, oppor­
tunities, decisions, and vulnerabilities of migrant workers but also come to create the nor­
mative landscape in which migrant workers move, act, and live. During the process of 
travel too, carrier sanction laws and civil aviation practices shape the conduct of commer­
cial airlines and place penalties (including hefty fines) on a carrier who allows a person to 
travel without the required documentation or fails to enforce the visa requirements of the 
destination state. Private companies are thus enrolled in the immigration infrastructure 
of a state, acting as de facto enforcers of a state’s immigration screening rules and 
processes beyond the state’s actual territory.44 And within a migrant’s state of employ­
ment, their private employers also become actors with authority, in some cases even 
called upon by state institutions to police immigration status and control migrants’ expe­
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riences of employment. While some initiatives such as the Dhaka Principles for Migration 
with Dignity, finalized by the Institute for Human Rights and Business in 2012, adopt a 
sector-wide approach to regulating this diffused set of actors in the migrant labor recruit­
ment supply chain, such initiatives remain largely at the margins of other state-champi­
oned practices.45
(p. 695) Finally, transnational migration law should also take into account the laws and 
practices of Indigenous nations across the world that also regulate migration, even if 
their laws and authority to do so are not always recognized by state institutions or other 
actors. For example, in settler colonial contexts, this can mean recognizing that Indige­
nous nations do as a matter of both fact and law exercise authority over their lands and 
the people residing and visiting there, using a variety of jurisdictional techniques and 
practices such as: enacting ceremonial welcomes; issuing, use, and recognition of First 
Nations passports; maintaining communal membership practices; practicing oral tradi­
tions of storytelling; adhering to Indigenous protocols for visiting places; and traveling 
along recognized travel routes.46 As I will discuss in the final section of this chapter, mi­
gration law scholars have a responsibility to acknowledge and foreground such practices 
as a form of sovereign lawmaking so as to not perpetuate the logic of settler colonialism, 
including the durability of the terra nullius doctrine, in our scholarship and academic 
praxis.47
C. Tracing Forms of Transnational Migration Law
Alongside these different sites, actors, and subjects of regulation, new transnational 
modes of regulation have emerged that shape how the relationship between authority and 
mobile people are constructed and governed. These include, but are not limited to, what I 
shall call the technologization, privatization, and securitization of transnational migration 
law. To illustrate, I elaborate briefly on each of these forms of regulation in the following, 
focusing in particular on how these forms increasingly mediate the relationship between 
the state as a dominant actor of regulating migration and the mobile person. In doing so, 
these regulatory modes not only change the patterns and practices of migration, but also 
transform understandings and practices of modern statecraft.
Technologization: It is almost trite to state that technology is rapidly reshaping the prac­
tices and forms of the transnational regulation of migration. From biometric passports to 
mobile phones to complex data management systems at state borders, technology has 
transformed the modes through which state institutions assert their control over mobile 
people as well as how migrants themselves might resist and subvert such practices of 
control. Stephan Scheel argues that while the “digitisation and datafication of border con­
trol practices” should be seen as the “continuation and refinement” of earlier practices of 
controlling and sorting potential migrants through visa regimes that operate within and 
beyond a state’s borders, he argues that it also important to account for “technological 
imperfections of biometric recognition systems, the trade-offs implicated in their imple­
mentation, the painstaking work it requires to make them work, the discretion of border 
control authorities on the ground and, most crucially, the capacity of those whose mobili­
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ty they serve to control to compromise and circumvent biometric recognition systems.”48 
Technological (p. 696) systems then are yet another site at which the contestations over 
migration control play out. Yet the technologization of migration law also provides possi­
bilities for forms of increased accountability, with, for instance, certain so-called “mi­
grant-sending” states using technology to seek to increase the effective operation of mi­
grant worker rights. Since 2016, for example, Pakistani migrant workers have been able 
to lodge complaints via an online system about their recruitment and employment to the 
Pakistani Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Development, thereby increasing 
the reach of the Pakistani state but also changing practices of diplomatic protection, gov­
ernmental responsibility and diaspora engagement.49 The potential and effectiveness of 
such technological forms of accountability for addressing and remedying migrant worker 
exploitation remain underexamined.
Privatization: The enrolment of private for-profit nonstate actors in the regulation and 
control of human mobility has resulted in the outsourcing of state responsibility and diffu­
sion of accountability for the regulation and control of mobile people. For example, the 
rise of immigration detention for people arriving without state authorization or overstay­
ing and/or breaching their visa conditions in places such as North America, Europe, and 
Australia has empowered private actors and corporations who run such places of deten­
tion. Multinational corporations such as G4S (the world’s largest security company) and 
Serco (a UK company that manages prisons and immigration detention centers in the 
United Kingdom and Australia) have become key global players in this immigration deten­
tion complex. For transnational corporations, migration control has “become business, 
big business” both in terms of profiting off individual migrants’ desires to move and the 
state attempts to control such movement.50 One prominent effect of the regulation of hu­
man mobility through privatization has been the intensification of the carceral state by 
entrenching the relationship between criminal modes of punishment and immigration law 
(referred to in migration scholarship as “crimmigration”) while also embedding private 
for-profit corporations into the disciplining of human mobility.51
Securitization: The “securitization” of migration through various state forms of control 
has long been documented and analyzed by scholars. Increasingly, such securitization 
practices have come to be enacted through a transnational military prism, resulting in the 
routine (p. 697) deployment of military tactics, personnel, and technology such as drones 
to patrol state borders and to treat the arrival of unauthorized migrants as a form of 
transnational organized crime. In recent years, the UN Security Council, too, has autho­
rized states to take military action against people categorized as “people smugglers” in 
an effort to combat human trafficking.52 Such resolutions have facilitated naval patrol op­
erations in the southern central Mediterranean Sea, mandated by decisions of the Coun­
cil of the European Union.53 To date, this has included the boarding and pushback of 
boats carrying migrants from Libya to southern Europe as well as the destruction of boats 
that have been or may be used in such “people smuggling operations”. While such actions 
may be seen to be consistent with certain international instruments such as the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,54 these operations have been 
routinely criticized for their severe breaches of international human rights standards, and 
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for the logics of deterrence, containment, and migrant exclusion that such practices en­
act.55 Seen in this vein, practices of transnational migration law are not only about chan­
neling human mobility and seeking to prevent coerced and unfree forms of migration, but 
conversely are also about authorizing violence against people transgressing state borders 
and producing states of entrapment and stasis for certain would-be migrants, thus affect­
ing whether people can move in the first place and which migrants are deemed worthy of 
the protections of human rights law.
To conclude, this brief overview of the regulation of human mobility in a world of plural, 
and potentially rival, lawmaking authorities has demonstrated the necessity of denatural­
izing the state as the privileged “container” through which to understand human 
mobility.56 This task involves understanding how states have come to be constituted and 
contested in and through their regulation of mobile people. As Joel Quirk and Darshan Vi­
gneswaran have argued:
human mobility has long played a foundational role in determining what states 
look like as spatial and political entities, how they accumulate power and re­
sources, what types of policies and strategies they pursue, and how they relate to 
their peers and other political, social, and economic actors. In short, mobility 
makes states.57
Paying attention to the productive and coercive dimensions of regulating human mobility 
thus allows for questioning the standard legal typologies for framing migration, while al­
so (p. 698) avoiding what Andreas Wemmer and Nina Glick Schiller have called “method­
ological nationalism.”58 Methodological nationalism in the context of migration law schol­
arship denotes approaches that take state borders as empirical facts, and fail to interro­
gate or historicize how migration has fed into processes of state construction, and vice 
versa. Yet, in developing an understanding of transnational migration law, it is also impor­
tant not to slip into what I shall term “methodological internationalism” that adopts the 
“global” as the ideal perspective and that see the international system of states as the 
“proper” and most optimal way of organizing the world. Such an approach of “method­
ological internationalism” fails to question how various international institutions and 
transnational processes, including the increased circulation of capital and goods, act to 
shore up and entrench this global ordering that has resulted in uneven and racialized pro­
duction and distribution of wealth, resources, and mobility in the world. After all, to con­
ceive of the world only in terms of formal states is, as Manu Karuka has put it, to “natu­
ralize colonialism.”59 Instead, this chapter suggests that in order to properly comprehend 
the construction, operation, dynamics, and effects of transnational migration law, we 
must be attentive to the way how practices of state migration law and regulation intersect 
with and are sustained by, and in turn sustain, a racialized global ordering of people that 
enable certain forms of precarity, exploitation, and abuse on the basis of a person’s state- 
attributed “status” within a state’s territory.
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III. Decolonizing Transnational Migration Law
If we as scholars of “transnational migration law” take such methodological challenges 
and political critiques seriously, then how might we think about the regulation of human 
mobility alongside struggles for and projects of decolonization and global justice in our 
academic work and praxis? How can and should transnational migration law and scholar­
ship respond to the vast and increasing global inequalities in our contemporary world 
produced through European colonialism and capitalism and maintained—or even exacer­
bated—through contemporary transnational legal regimes around trade, finance, proper­
ty, and food, to name but a few examples? How do we understand the global ordering of 
people in relation to the present-day uneven sharing of wealth, resources, and opportuni­
ty, and state attempts to monopolize authority through legal forms of sovereignty?
A. Global Justice, Inequality, and Migration
Importantly, E. Tendayi Achiume has called on scholars of international law to reconceive 
of migration as decolonization, where the migration of Third World citizens to First World 
states “can be understood to enact an important step in…the pursuit of a long overdue 
geopolitical reordering of benefits of a global order.”60 Achiume’s normative argument is 
(p. 699) based on demonstrating that citizens of First World and Third World states are 
“not political strangers” to each other.61 Rather, for Achiume, the First and Third Worlds 
exist in relationships of co-sovereignty and interdependence forged through practices of 
imperial exploitation and extraction established during the colonial period and continued 
long after the national liberation of formerly colonized people through forms of contempo­
rary neocolonialism. Such historic interconnections and ongoing injustices mean that 
First World states therefore should have “no more right to exclude Third World persons 
than they do their own citizens” and, conversely, citizens of formerly colonized places 
have a particular right of admission into First World states as a mode of redressing the 
“colonial advantage” that First World states have gained through colonialism and that is 
maintained in and through contemporary international (legal) frameworks. Such individ­
ual migration, Achiume argues, should be viewed as a legitimate, ethical, and importantly 
remedial personal response to conditions of neocolonial subordination and as a “matter of 
corrective distributive justice” on a global scale. Third World migration thus constitutes a 
valid form of “opportunity-enhancement” behavior for Third World citizens, even if it 
should not necessarily guarantee them the same rights of citizenship or permanent be­
longing in First World states as enjoyed by First World citizens. While Achiume realizes 
that such “postcolonial” migration is a “remarkably personal circumvention of the nation 
state,” nonetheless, for Achiume, it necessitates a fundamental reimagining of sovereign­
ty as a legal concept and holds the possibility of “different construction of the baseline re­
lationship between political-economic migrants and the receiving sovereign.”62
Achiume’s intervention in the field of international migration law is timely and much 
needed, as it reminds us to foreground the power and potential of Third World migration 
as a matter of material redistribution and global justice. It provides a politically useful le­
gal argument for expanding the prevailing practices of belonging, notions of entitlements, 
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and spheres of inclusion on the basis of historically produced rights and relations in First 
World states as a strategy of responding to colonial injustices. It thus makes the histori­
cally constructed borders of states the “perennial objects” of accountability.63 However, in 
thinking about the transformative potential of migration in an individualized way (albeit 
on a mass scale), Achiume’s proposal still leaves intact the existing international order of 
states that rests upon the logic of state borders as both the makers and markers of deter­
mining questions of belonging, entitlement, and difference.64 This is particularly problem­
atic in the context of settler-colonial states, where the imposition and maintenance of 
state borders enable the ongoing colonization and appropriation of Indigenous lands, and 
function as a mechanism for seeking to subordinate prior and ongoing Indigenous forms 
of sovereignty over land and peoples.65
(p. 700) Instead, scholars of decolonization from Indigenous standpoints have argued that 
decolonization requires a more fundamental unsettling of settler colonialism—in all its 
epistemological, material, and psychological forms—and a recognition of and reckoning 
with Indigenous sovereignties and forms of sociality. Writing from Turtle Island (North 
America), Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, in particular, have argued that decolonization 
must necessarily also entail a material redistribution of authority over space, people, and 
resources, and the “repatriation of Indigenous land and life.” Indeed, to think of decolo­
nization otherwise would mean that Third World migration to settler colonial states of the 
“First World” risks intensifying the practices of dispossession and logic of elimination at 
work in settler colonialism. Tuck and Yang write:
People of color who enter/are brought into the settler colonial nation-state also en­
ter the triad of relations between settler-native-slave. We are referring here to the 
colonial pathways that are usually described as ‘immigration’ and how the 
refugee/immigrant/migrant is invited to be a settler in some scenarios, given the 
appropriate investments in whiteness, or is made an illegal, criminal presence in 
other scenarios.66
Thinking with this triangulation of settler–native–slave reveals how as a result of paradox­
ical logics of assimilation and differential practices of racialization, “[s]ome labor be­
comes settler, while excess labor becomes enslavable, criminal, murderable.” Decoloniza­
tion, for Tuck and Yang, then means the undoing of the settler nation in order to reorient 
toward Indigenous sovereignties and futurities, through an embrace of an “ethics of in­
commensurability.”67 Put more simply, what decolonization requires is clear, through the 
work of Indigenous theorists; what form decolonization may take and how decolonization 
will occur in settler colonial states is more open to historical contingency and not know­
able in advance.
Recognizing and seeking to address the unequal access to and distribution of citizenship 
in the world—and its implications for the ability of people to travel in authorized, less 
dangerous, and less exploitative ways—is only one element then in comprehending global 
injustice. Migrant struggles for justice must be thought alongside Indigenous practices of 
self-determination and nationhood in order to adequately and meaningfully account for 
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global justice in the present. How we as migration law scholars narrate transnational mi­
gration law must be engaged in such endeavors. This means taking seriously past and 
present (p. 701) Indigenous mobility practices and Indigenous legal techniques for autho­
rizing and making lawful certain forms of mobility.68
B. Telling “Counterstories” as an Academic Praxis
Storytelling is political. Depending on the standpoint of the narrator, the mode of narra­
tion and the geopolitical context in which stories are told and received, stories can autho­
rize and reproduce dominant power structures, or intervene in and transform global hier­
archies, social imaginaries, and collective movements for social change.69 What stories 
we tell, pay attention to and foreground as scholars of transnational migration law re­
veals a great deal about how we conceive of, locate, and relate to power and authority, in 
particular whose laws we recognize and who we deem to be an actor of transnational mi­
gration lawmaking. For many Indigenous scholars, stories hold law, and acts of story­
telling can function as acts of legal obligation, transmission, and place-making.70 For non- 
Indigenous scholars, like myself, foregrounding “counterstories” of transnational migra­
tion lawmaking to that of the state or market may function as a form of academic solidari­
ty and commitment to projects of anti-racism and decolonization.71 In this final section, I 
suggest that stories can have a powerful role to play in the necessary work of undoing 
colonial borders and state practices of bordering in the present, provided they are told 
and received within an ethical framework that emphasizes the narrator’s positionality and 
an ethics of nonappropriation, permission-seeking, and respect.72
One possible orientation that such stories can take is to reveal the connections between 
state treatment of Indigenous peoples and racialized migrants in settler colonial contexts. 
This may include stories of how both Indigenous peoples and racialized migrants are 
made exceptional in state law, and subject to similar techniques of state documentation, 
intrusion, and incarceration. Analyzing the use of the plenary power in the United States, 
Susan Bibler Coutin, Justin Richland, and Véronique Fortin, for example, have mobilized 
personal stories of migrant and Indigenous peoples’ encounters with the law to show how 
such state (p. 702) techniques of claiming jurisdiction “function of granting ‘fullness’ to 
the United States while at the same time requiring certain populations to routinely claim 
exceptionality.”73 In the Australian context, the Deathscapes project, led by Suvendrini 
Perera and Joseph Pugliese, has collated stories of state-perpetrated abuses and custodial 
deaths of Indigenous people and migrants as a way of documenting, mapping, and ulti­
mately resisting contemporary forms of racialized violence across settler colonial loca­
tions. Focusing on a variety of sites, including “police cells, prisons and immigration de­
tention centres,” these stories seek “not to collapse the differences between racialized 
groups, or to ignore the presence of other racialized populations in these states, but to 
address some of the shared strategies, policies, practices and rationales of state violence 
deployed in the management of these separate categories.”74
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Another orientation that such stories can and do take is to draw attention to the effect of 
colonial states borders in dividing Indigenous nations and obscuring Indigenous sover­
eignties. For example, Theresa McCarthy has written about how the Six Nations of the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy have historically negotiated the state-imposed border con­
trols that act to divide and marginalize their political authority and communal life. She 
writes that while “the U.S.–Canada ‘border’ is a settler construct that is foreign and with­
out meaning to Haudenosaunee cosmology, it has had very real, substantive implications 
for the social and political coherence of Haudenosaunee people over time.” Nonetheless, 
despite these state borders, McCarthy shows how the “inherent sovereignty of Hau­
denosaunee has been continually articulated as the right to determine citizenship, leader­
ship, and freedom of movement within territorial homelands.”75 This means that state 
borders have never fully been able to remove Indigenous control over what Amar Bhatia 
has called Indigenous “re-peopling” powers (that is, Indigenous authority over acts of 
procreation, marriage, adoption, citizenship, and immigration), despite considerable en­
deavors to do so.76 For example, a recent Australian High Court case has challenged the 
Australian government’s constitutional powers to deport people who are members of 
Indigenous nations in Australia but who do not have Australian citizenship (people who in 
the legal terminology of the settler colonial state are deemed “Indigenous non- 
citizens”).77 With the majority of the High Court ultimately holding that Aboriginal Aus­
tralians occupy a “unique or sui generis position…such that they are not aliens” under the 
Australian Constitution, the decision (p. 703) impels a reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the Australian settler colonial state’s deportation powers and the operation of 
Indigenous sovereignty and the right to self-determination. As Bhatia writes, “viewing 
Indigenous nations as self-determining nations means recognizing their inherent rights 
and power to reproduce their societies through birth and immigration,” even if settler 
colonial states through strategies of elimination seek to submerge and ultimately elimi­
nate such Indigenous forms of authority.78 Similarly, Louise Boon-Kuo has argued that the 
current Australian settler colonial state’s use of migration law in attempts to deport 
Indigenous people deemed noncitizens must be understood within a longer colonial histo­
ry of dispossessing Indigenous peoples, separating Indigenous families, and deporting 
racialized noncitizens: all practices tied to a project of making Australia a “white” nation 
that was inaugurated upon the foundational and continued denial of Indigenous sover­
eignty. For Boon-Kuo, such practices of “white possessive sovereignty” remind us of the 
need for migration scholarship to “engage with the continued existence and state denial 
of First Nation sovereignties.”79
A third possible orientation for such stories of transnational migration law can be to fore­
ground Indigenous-to-Indigenous practices of law. Here, for example, the stories of 
Indigenous uses of the passport as potentially disruptive anticolonial legal objects can 
make visible the ongoing practices of sovereignty and recognition of Indigenous nations 
in the present as well as the failure on the part of settler colonial states to “fully monopo­
lise” the “legitimate means of movement.” Audra Simpson, for example, has theorized 
how Indigenous practices of sovereignty that utilize the passport form, rather than seek­
ing to replicate European or settler colonial border practices, instead exercise a “funda­
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mentally interrupted and interruptive capacity” to the existent settler colonial state and 
international ordering of political authority.80 Similarly, Joseph Pugliese has suggested in 
the Australian context that Indigenous acts of issuing and using Aboriginal passports 
function as “counter-discursive resignification of the very technology—the passport—de­
ployed by the settler-colonial Australian state in order to consolidate and reproduce the 
ongoing usurpation of Indigenous sovereignty.”81 In doing so, Pugliese argues, Aboriginal 
uses of the passport act to “mark Aboriginal people’s unceded and unextinguished sover­
eignty over Country and their right to offer welcome and hospitality within their own 
lands.”82 Foregrounding such stories in accounts of transnational migration law, then, 
heeds plural and rival forms of authority over land and people, and works against the 
dominant logics of settler colonial formations that would seek to eradicate and deny 
Indigenous sovereignties, nationhoods, and futures.
(p. 704) IV. Conclusion
This chapter has provided an account of transnational migration law as an empirical, 
methodological, and normative inquiry. If transnational migration law is the object of in­
vestigation of this chapter, I have argued that it is not an already-present phenomenon or 
readily given object of inquiry. Rather, it is constructed through deploying the terminolo­
gy of the “transnational” in relation to a politics of recognition. What does or should 
count as transnational migration law? Who is recognized as a lawful authority over hu­
man mobility? And what are the implications of this constitutive boundary-drawing exer­
cise, in delimiting what is, and what is not, transnational migration law? At stake in such 
an exercise is more than merely the task of accurate description or reconstruction. It is 
rather the possibility of enabling more just coexistences between plural forms of law and 
the task of thinking through what a transnational migration law might look like that rec­
ognizes the necessity of thinking migrant justice within and beyond the settler colonial 
state.
To conclude, I want to return to another story about passports as documents that can at­
test to the regulation of human mobility in a world of plural authorities and that opens up 
the importance of decolonizing approaches to “transnational migration law.” In 2013, a 
Freedom Solidarity Flotilla consisting of a delegation of Aboriginal Elders and West 
Papuan freedom activists sailed from Naarm/Melbourne to Manokwari in support of the 
independence struggle of the West Papuan people and to denounce the Australian 
government’s support for Indonesia’s military interventions. Traveling on his Original Na­
tions Passport as part of the delegation, Gunai man Robbie Thorpe articulated the impor­
tance of Indigenous passports as a form of inter-Indigenous sovereign relations and law­
making, including in the context of human mobility:
Aboriginal Passports represent a Global Safe Travel document; Indigenous people 
of Australia have never invaded or attacked another country, Aboriginal people 
represent peace and these passports represent a connection between Indigenous 
people around the world who have suffered at the hands of colonisation.…Who[se] 
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borders are these anyway? Why should we require the white man’s documents to 
travel to West Papua? Our lands were once connected, our cultures entwined for 
thousands of years, we don’t need authority from Australia or Indonesia to do as 
we have always done. Aboriginal Passports are a real statement about our land, 
our identity, our lore. Australia and Indonesia can live the lie, but we the Indige­
nous people don’t subscribe to that.83
Scholars of transnational migration law thus have a responsibility to recognize and ana­
lyze both the multitude of practices, sites, actors, and forms of migration control (in all 
their complexity, violence, and exclusions) and to foreground the varied rival forms of au­
thority over the regulation of both space and mobile people that present a challenge to 
the current international ordering and maintenance of states, an international system 
that is the ongoing product of imperialism and settler colonial formations as well as strug­
gles for decolonisation.
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